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THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF
SWIFT V. TYSON SINCE 1900
H. PARKEa SHARP and JOSEPH B. BRENNAN*
INTRODUCTION
It was enacted by the Thirty-fourth Section of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 that the laws of the several states, except where
the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States should
otherwise require or provide, should be regarded as rules of
decision in trials at the common law in the courts of the United
States, in cases where they apply.' This is now Section 725 of
Title 28 of the United States Code. The requirement of this
section does not by its terms extend to suits in equity. The
United States Supreme Court, however, has said that Section
725 merely declares a principle which would exist in the absence
of such a statute.2 Consequently, the federal courts apply the
laws of the several states even in equity. 3
Suits in admiralty likewise fall without the express provisions
of Section 725.4 Since the substantive maritime law is -4ot state
law,5 the general principle behind Section 725 is inapplicable
in admiralty litigation. It is true that rights arising under state
* See p. 400 for biographical notes.
1 1 Stat. 92 (1845) Sec. 34; U. S. Rev. Stat. (1875) Sec. 721; Comp.
Stat. (1916) Sec. 1538.
2 See Mason v. United States, 260 U. S. 545, 558, 559 (1923).
31bid.; Bellamy v. Pitts, 4 F. (2d) 523 (C. C. A. 5th, 1925). But cf.
Guffey v. Smith, 237 U. S. 101 (1915); Clark v. Andrew, 11 F. (2nd) 958
(C. C. A. 5th, 1926).
4 Davis v. Smokeless Fuel Co., 196 Fed. 753 (C. C. A. 2d, 1912).
G See Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 215, 216 (1917);
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, 163, 164, 166 (1920);
Chelentis v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 247 U. S. 372, 381, 382, 384 (1918). But
cf. Proctor v. Dillon, 235 Mass. 538, 129 N. E. 265 (1920).
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statutes are sometimes enforced in admiralty.6 But this is done
only in so far as state statutes are permitted to alter the sub-
stantive maritime law.7 How far state statutes may affect
substantive maritime law is a question beyond the scope of this
paper.8
Section 725 does not apply to criminal prosecutions by the
federal government in its own courts." Since there are no fed-
eral common law crimes,10 these prosecutions must rest entirely
on federal statutes. No question of following state criminal
laws can, therefore, arise.
It has been said that Section 725 refers only to substantive
law, and not to procedure. 1 Which party has the burden of
proof may be a matter of substantive law.12 But most questions
in the field of evidence are procedural, and it has been held that
Section 725 requires the federal courts to follow the state laws
on matters of evidence.' 3
There are now many federal statutes prescribing rules of
evidence for the federal courts. 14 These include the competency
of witnesses, admissibility of records, etc. In so far as these
statutes are pertinent they have supplanted Section 725.15
In determining how far Section 725 is applicable to trials at
the common law in the federal courts, the problem arises as
6 The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398 (1907).
7 See Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 216 (1917).
8 See (1927) 40 Harv. L. Rev. 485.
9 United States v. Central Vermont Ry., 157 Fed. 291 (S. D. N. Y. 1907).
10 United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 7 Cranch (U. S.) 32 (1812).
11 See McBride v. Neal, 214 Fed. 966, 969 (C. C. A. 7th, 1914); 3 Foster,
Federal Practice (6th Ed. 1921) Sec. 477.
12Central Vermont Ry. v. White, 238 U. S. 507 (1915); New Orleans &
N. E. R. R. Co. v. Harris, 247 U. S. 367 (1918). Contra: Sackheim v.
Pigueron, 215 N. Y. 62, 109 N. E. 109 (1915).
13 M'Niel v. Holbrook, 12 Pet. (U. S.) 84 (1838) ; Vance v. Campbell, 1
Black (U. S.) 427 (1862); Wright v. Bales, 2 Black (U. S.) 535 (1863);
Ryan v. Bindley, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 66 (1864).
14 28 U. S. C. (1926) ch. 17.
15 Since the passing of the Conformity Act of 1872 [17 Stat. 197 (1873)
Sec. 5; U. S. Rev. Stat. (1875) See. 914; 28 U. S. C. (1926) Sec. 724;
Comp. Stat. (1916) Sec. 1537] there has been an uncertainty in the federal
decisions as to whether matters of evidence fall within this act or section
725. Ex parte Fiske, 113 U. S. 713 (1885); Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v.
Kendall, 167 Fed. 62 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909); Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. Luray
Supply Co., 6 F. (2d) 218 (C. C. A- 4th, 1925). Cf. Leach v. Peirson, 48
Sup. Ct. 57 (1927). Cf. also Conrad v. Wheelock, 24 F. (2d) 996 (S. D. Ill.
1928).
THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE
to what are "laws of the several states" within the meaning of
that section. It has never been doubted that the statutory enact-
ments of the states are "laws" which will control the decisions of
federal courts.16 Decisions of state courts construing state
statutes17 or declaring their legal effect'8 are likewise binding
on the federal courts.1 9 However, when state courts, purporting
to interpret state statutes, really read in provisions which can-
not be found by any reasonable rules of construction, their
decisions will not be binding on the federal courts.20 And when
state decisions are rested upon the common law rather than
upon construction of a statute on which they might have been
based, the federal courts are not bound by such decisions and
may form their own opinion as to the meaning of the statute.2'
In a large number of cases in the federal courts questions are
involved which do not depend on any statute, but do fall within
principles established by state decisions. The United States
Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Story in the now-
famous case of Swift v. Tyson,22 held that on matters of general
commercial law the federal courts were not bound by Section
725 to follow state decisions. The application of this section was
16 See Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. (U. S.) 1, 19 (1842) ; Mason v. United
States, 260 U. S. 545, 557 (1923).
17 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U. S. 389 (1900); Maiorano
v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 213 U. S. 268 (1909); Lisman v. Knickerbocker
Trust Co., 211 Fed. 413 (C. C. A. 6th, 1914); Stonebraker v. Hunter, 215
Fed. 67 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914).
18 Roberts, Johnson & Rand Shoe Co. v. Dower, 208 Fed. 270 (C. C. A.
7th, 1913).
19 Decisions of lower state courts are not binding on the federal courts.
Continental Securities Co. v. Interborough. Rapid Transit Co., 165 Fed. 945
(S. D. N. Y. 1908); U. S. Telephone Co. v. Central Union Tel. Co., 202 Fed.
66 (C. C. A. 6th, 1913). But cf. North Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith,
13 F. (2d) 585 (C. C. A. 3d, 1926).
Cases in which federal courts refuse to follow the construction of state
statutes by state courts because rights have accrued before the state deci-
sions were rendered are not within the scope of this paper. See Stanly
County v. Coler & Co., 190 U. S. 437 (1903); Great. So. Fireproof Hotel Co.
v. Jones, 193 U. S. 532 (1904); Ware County v. National Surety Co., 17 F.
(2d) 444 (S. D. Ga. 1927).
2o Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lane, 151 Fed. 276 (E. D. Ga. 1907) ; Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. Nance, 12 F. (2d) 575 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926). See Watson v.
Employers' Liability Assur. Co., 23 F. (2d) 682, 685, 687 (N. D. Tex. 1928).
21 Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 15 F.
(2) 509 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926), affirmed U. S. Sup. Ct., April 9, 1928; Rison v.
Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 28 F. (2d) 788 (N. D. Cal. 1928).
2216 Pet. (U. S.) 1 (1842).
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said to be limited to the positive statutes of the several states,
to the construction thereof by the state courts, and to local
usages concerning rights in, and titles to, immovable property.
It is not the purpose of this paper to criticise the doctrine of
Swift v. Tyson,2s but rather to see how the doctrine has been
applied by the federal courts in cases decided by them since 1900.
THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF SWIFT V. TYSON
I. Commercial Paper
In Swift v. Tyson it was held that the federal circuit court in
New York was not bound by what appeared to be the holding
of the New York cases, that the surrender of an antecedent debt
is not value for the transfer of negotiable instruments. It has
subsequently been held that whether a provision in a promissory
note for payment of attorney's fees in case of default renders
the note non-negotiable is a question of general jurisprudence24
on which the federal courts will exercise an independent judg-
ment.2 5 In Bank of Saginaw v. Title & Trust Co.,26 the federal
circuit court held, contrary to the state decisions, that cer-
tificates of deposit are negotiable instruments. The court in
this case said that the parties did not contract with reference to
the state or federal decisions, but with reference to the general
commercial law. The application of the doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson has resulted in many states in two different conceptions
as to what the general commercial law is. But business men
contract on the basis of one or the other of these conceptions.
23 See Heiskell, "Conflict between Federal and State Decisions," 16 Am.
L. Rev. 743 (1882); Eliot, "The Common Law of the Federal Courts," 36
Am. L. Rev. 498 (1902); Trickett, "Non-Federal Law Administered in Fed-
eral Courts," 40 Am. L. Rev. 819 (1906); Schofield, "Swift v. Tyson: Uni-
formity of Judge-Made State Law in State and Federal Courts," 4 Iln. L.
Rev. 533 (1910); Meigs, "Decisions of the Federal Courts on Questions of
State Law," 45 Am. L. Rev. 47 (1911); Warren, "New Light on the History
of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789," 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49 (1923).
24 Since the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson has been extended to many cases
not involving commercial law, the federal courts have adopted the phrase
"general jurisprudence" to denote questions on which they will not be
bound by state decisions. See infra.
25 State National Bank v. Cudahy Packing Co., 126 Fed. 543 (W. D. Mo.
1904).
26 105 Fed. 491 (W. D. Pa. 1900).
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It is not reasonable to believe that any business man would
contract on the basis of a general commercial law in the abstract.
The main purpose of the rule in Swift v. Tyson is to secure
uniformity in those fields in which the federal courts deem it
most necessary. Uniformity is especially desirable in the case
of negotiable instruments. They are intended to circulate freely
from state to state. It would greatly impede their marketability
if prospective purchasers were bound to ascertain whether the
instruments had become subject to any peculiar local rules.
How far has the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson in regard to com-
mercial paper been supplanted by the adoption of the Negotiable
Instruments Law? The general rule, as pointed out above,27
is that federal courts are bound by state decisions construing
state statutes. But there has been an indication that the federal
courts will not follow state decisions construing the Negotiable
Instruments Law.28 The theory of these cases is that, since the
Negotiable Instruments Act is merely declaratory of the general
commercial law, the federal courts have not been deprived by
its enactment of the right to form their own opinion as to what
this general commercial law is. The courts have been helped in
reaching this result by the consideration that the Negotiable
Instruments Law was designed to create a uniform law through-
out the United States. The same motive which was responsible
for the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson may lead federal courts to
disregard state decisions construing the Negotiable Instruments
Law when they think these decisions contrary to the general
trend.
But if federal courts are right in saying that the Negotiable
Instruments AcV is merely declaratory of the common law, it is
only reasonable to believe that the legislature of the state enact-
ing it intended thereby to codify the law as declared by its own
courts.29 On this hypothesis the rules established by state
decisions are as much a part of the statute as the express pro-
visions thereof and should be equally binding on the federal
courts. If, however, the Negotiable Instruments Law was
intended to change the common law, then the state court
27 See p. 367, n. 4, supra.
28 See Forrest v. Safety Banking & Trust Co., 174 Fed. 345, 348 (E. D.
Pa. 1909); Kobey v. Hoffman, 229 Fed. 486, 489 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916);
Capital City State Bank v. Swift, 290 Fed. 505, 509, 510 (E. D. Okla. 1923);
Peterson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 19 F. (2d) 74, 84 (S. D. Iowa 1926).
29 Cf. Central Vermont Ry. v. White, 238 U. S. 507, 512 (1915).
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decisions interpreting this statute should be binding on the fed-
eral courts just as decisions interpreting any other state statute
which has worked a change in the common law.30
Questions as to the nature of the transaction in the deposit
of commercial paper are questions of general jurisprudence.
The federal courts apply their own rules in determining whether
a trust, an agency for collection or a debtor-creditor relationship
arises.31 Consequently, the federal courts reach their own con-
clusion as to the liability of the depositary and the collecting
banks to the depositor.
II. Simple Contracts
The proper interpretation of a contract is a matter of general
law.32 When a person authorizes a broker to sell his land, the
question whether there is a promise not to revoke the authority
which becomes binding upon the broker's undertaking perform-
ance has been held a question of interpretation on which the
federal courts will not be bound by state decisions. 33 Likewise,
the federal courts will form their own judgment as to what
rights were intended to be created by a c. i. f. contract. 34 In
an action against a commercial surety company on a statutory
contractor's bond the question whether the usual rule of
strictissimi juris favoring sureties should be applied in inter-
preting the bond is a matter of general law.3 5 The federal
courts will also form their own opinion as to whether in a con-
tract of guarantee it was intended that the obligee should
exhaust all his remedies against the principal debtor before
striking the guarantor.3 6
30 See Peterson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 19 F. (2d) 74, 84 (S. D.
Iowa 1926).
31 In re Jarmulowsky, 249 Fed. 319 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918); Taylor &
Bournique Co. v. National Bank of Ashtabula, 262 Fed. 168 (N. D. Ohio
1919); Spokane & Eastern Trust Co. v. U. S. Steel Products Co., 290 Fed.
884 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923); City of Douglas v. Federal Reserve Bank, 300
Fed. 573 (W. D. Texas 1924); Bryant v. Williams, 16 F. (2d) 159 (E. D.
N. C. 1926); Dickinson v. First Nat. Bank, 26 F. (2d) 441 (C. C. A. 8th
1928).
S2°See Keene Five Cent Say. Bank v. Reid, 123 Fed. 221, 226 (C. C. A.
8th, 1903).
33 Shawver v. Ewing, 1 F. (2d) 423 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924).
34 Harper v. Hochstin, 278 Fed. 102 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921).
35 See Ware County v. National Surety Co., 17 F. (2d) 444, 445 (S. D.
Ga. 1927). Cf. Casserleigh v. Wood, 119 Fed. 308, 313 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902).
S6 Johnson v. Norton Co., 159 Fed. 361 (C. C. A. 6th, 1908).
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There are three views as to the right of a third person not a
party to a contract to sue thereon in the federal courts. It has
been held that the federal courts will apply their own rule
denying the beneficiary of a contract to which he is not a party
a direct right at law, regardless of the decisions of the state
where the contract was made or to be performed, and regardless
of the decisions of the state in which the federal court sits. 37 A
second view is that a third party may maintain a direct action
at law in a federal court on a contract made for his benefit
when such a right is recognized by the decisions of the state
court in the state where the contract was made.38 Still another
view is that the right of a third party to sue on a contract is
dependent upon whether such relief is afforded by the state
courts of the state in which the federal court sits.39 Sometimes
a contract for the benefit of a third party is made and per-
formable in the same state where the third party later sues in
the federal court. In this situation the federal court may refuse
to apply an independent federal rule without deciding whether
it is following the decisions of a state because the contract was
made there or because the federal court is sitting in that state.40
In deciding which of successive assignees of a chose in action
is to prevail, the federal courts are not bound by state
decisions.41
An action for an anticipatory breach of contract can be
brought in a federal court, although under state decisions no
cause of action has yet accrued.42
Whether a carrier's stipulation against liability for negligent
injury to a passenger or an employee is valid and enforceable
is a question of general jurisprudence on which state decisions
are not controlling. 43 But it has been held that the validity of
37 See Mobile Shipbuilding Co. v. Fed. Bridge & Struct. Co., 280 Fed.
292, 294 (C. C. A. 7th, 1922). Certiorari denied, 260 U. S. 726 (1923).
38 See Bethlehem Iron Co. v. Hoadley, 152 Fed. 736 (D. R. I. 1907)
(semble).
39 Gibson v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 232 Fed. 225 (D. N. J. 1916).
40 Smith & Co. v. Wilson, 9 F. (2d) 51 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925).
41 Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Finance Co., 264 U. S. 182 (1924);
In re Leterman, Becker & Co., 260 Fed. 543 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919), certiorari
denied, sub nom. Coleman & Co. v. Tawas Co., 250 U. S. 668 (1919).
42 Smith Co. v. Minetto-Meriden Co., 168 Fed. 777 (Conn. 1909); Colo-
rado Yule Marble Co. v. Collins, 230 Fed. 78 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915).
43 Fowler v. Penna. R. Co., 229 Fed. 373 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916); Tripp v.
Mich. Cent. R. Co., 238 Fed. 449 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917).
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a stipulation in a lease by a railroad of a strip on its right-of-
way for a storage warehouse by which the railroad company was
exempted from liability for damage by fire caused by the negli-
gence of its servants, was a matter of local law and governed
by state decisions. 44 A distinguishing element in this case may
be that it involved liability for injury to real property.4 5
Whether an arbitration clause is contrary to public policy, as
being an attempt to oust the courts of jurisdiction, will be
determined by the federal courts on principles of general juris-
prudence, although a different rule prevails under the state
decisions in the state where the agreemnt was made and in the
state where the suit is brought.
4 6
The federal courts will form their own opinion as to the legal-
ity of a contract made by a railroad granting to a taxicab com-
pany exclusive privileges on its premises.
47
III. Insurance
Whether the assignee of an insurance policy must have an
insurable interest will be determined by the federal courts
independently of state decisions.
48
It has been held that when a blanket policy and a specific
insurance policy both cover the same property, there will be a
prorating of the loss suffered, although a contrary rule has been
announced by the state court.4 9 But the federal court in the
same district later decided that it was bound to follow the state
rule requiring the specific policy to be exhausted before resort
could be had to the blanket policy.50
44 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 175 U. S. 91
(1899).
45 See infra, pp. 377, 378.
46 Haskell v. MoClintic-Marshall Co., 289 Fed. 405 (G. C. A. 9th, 1923).
Cf. Aktieselskabet Korn-Og, etc. v. Rederiaktiebolaget, etc., 250 Fed. 935
(C. C. A. 2d, 1918).
47 Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., U. S.
Sup. Ct., decided April 9, 1928.
48 Gordon v. Ware National Bank, 132 Fed. 444 (C. C. A. 8th, 1904);
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lane, 151 Fed. 276 (E. D. Ga. 1907). So also whether
a policy is voided when the beneficiary ceases to have an insurable interest.
Kansas City Life Insurance Co. v. Adamson, 24 F. (2d) 712 (N. D. Tex.
1928).
49 Meigs v. London Assur. Co., 126 Fed. 781 (E. D. Pa. 1904).
50 Turk v. Newark Fire Ins. Co., 4 F. (2d) 142 (E. D. Pa. 1925).
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Whether the parol evidence rule prevents proof of an estop-
pel15 or waiver 52 of an insurance company is a matter of gen-
eral law. So also the federal courts will not be bound by state
decisions denying an insurance company a defense for failure
to file notice of loss within a specified time, although such
requirement was expressed as a condition precedent in the
policy.53 For the same reason a provision in a policy that no
action should be brought more than one year after the insured's
death was upheld, although there had been a state decision to
the contrary.54
IV. Corporations
Since many of the questions of corporation law involve statu-
tory construction, 55 the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson cannot be
applied to them. It has, accordingly, been held in suits against
municipal corporations for injuries caused by negligence that
their liability is a question of local law, upon which the decisions
of the supreme court of the state are authoritative in the
national courts.58 But whether a municipality is liable for bonds
which have been irregularly issued is said to be a question of
general commercial law on which the state decisions are not con-
trolling.57 It seems, however, that the capacity of a municipal
corporation to incur obligations on bonds irregularly issued is
a matter of statutory construction on which the state decisions
should be conclusive. The different view taken by the federal
courts can probably be explained by the fact that they are here
dealing with negotiable instruments. For when simple contract
obligations of municipalities are before a federal court it will
51Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Nance, 12 F. (2d) 575 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926).
52 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 13 F. (2d) 824 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
53 Bank of So. Jacksonville v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 1 F. (2d) 43
(S. D. Fla. 1924).
5 4 Spinks v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n., 137 Fed. 169 (E. D. Ky.
1905).
5 5 Hummell v. Warren Steel Casting Co., 5 F. (2d) 451 (C. C. A. 8th,
1925).
56 Blaylock v. Incorp. Town of Muskogee, 117 Fed. 125 (C. C. A. 8th,
1902); City of Denver v. Porter, 126 Fed. 288 (C. C. A. 8th, 1903); City
of Manchester v. Landry, 199 Fed. 882 (C. C. A. 1st, 1912).
57 Clapp v. Otoe County, 104 Fed. 473 (C. C. A. 8th, 1900) ; Independent
School Dist. v. Rew, 111 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 8th, 1901); Town of Newbern v.
National Bank, 234 Fed. 209 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916).
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follow state decisions holding such contracts unauthorized and
void.5S
V. Torts
For the most part, in negligence cases federal courts are not
bound by state decisions.59 But it has been indicated that judi-
cial comity might require a federal court "to bow to a line of
decisions so uniform and well settled and extending through so
long a time as to establish a rule of conduct which it would be
wrong to disturb". 60
The mere fact that an action is brought under a state statute
is not sufficient to put the obligation on a federal court to follow
state decisions on questions of contributory negligence which
are not peculiar to that kind of action.61 But it is interesting
to compare such a holding with the admiralty cases under state
wrongful death acts. In these cases, contrary to the general
admiralty rule, the courts hold contributory negligence a bar,
since it would be such under the state decisions.62
The meaning and extent of the doctrine of the last clear
chance has been held to be a part of the negligence law of a
state which a federal court will follow. 63
On the other hand, the federal courts have held that they need
not follow state decisions in cases involving the doctrine of
attractive nuisances.64 But, as pointed out above, the state
decisions may have established such a settled rule of conduct
that the federal courts will follow them in attractive nuisance
cases. 65 Even here it has been indicated that only a statutory
58 Greenburg Iron Co. v. City of Abbeville, 2 F. (2d) 559 (C. C. A. 5th,
1924).
59 Force v. Standard Silk Co., 160 Fed. 992 (N. D. N. Y. 1908); Wald-
ron v. Director General, 266 Fed. 196 (C. C. A. 4th, 1920).
0o See Snare & Triest Co. v. Friedman, 169 Fed. 1, 14 (C. C. A. 3d,
1909) ; Roberts v. Tenn. Coal & Iron Co., 255 Fed. 469 (C. C. A. 5th, 1919) ;
Boston & Main R. Co. v. Daniel, 290 Fed. 916 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923). But see
Bush v. Bremner, 29 F. (2d) 844, D. Mim 1928.
61 Parramore v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 5 F. (2d) 912 (C. C. A. 8th,
1925).
e2 Truelson v. Whitney & Bodden Shipping Co., 10 F. (2d) 412 (C. C. A.
5th, 1926).
06 Houston v. D. L. & W. R. Co., 274 Fed. 599 (C. C. A. 3d, 1921).
64 Snare & Triest Co. v. Friedman, 169 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 3d, 1909), 40
L. R. A. (N. S.) 367 (1912); Chesko v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 218 Fed.
804 (G. C. A. 3d, 1914); N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Fruchter, 271 Fed. 419
(C. C. A. 2d, 1921), reversed on other grounds, 260 U. S. 141 (1922).
t5 See Snare & Triest Co. v. Friedman, supra, at 14; Chesko v. Dels-
ware & Hudson Co., supra, at 806.
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enactment by competent authority would justify a federal court
in departing from the doctrine of attractive nuisances as laid
down by the Supreme Court of the United States.66
The liability of a master for personal injuries to a servant
is, in the absence of a state statute, a matter of general law.67
Federal courts will not be bound by state decisions to to whether
a man is a vice principal or a fellow servant.68
Whether a lessor railway company is liable for the negligence
of the lessee is a matter of general law on which state decisions
are not controlling. 69 A federal court has also refused to follow
the state rule exempting a railroad from liability to a shipper's
employee for injuries resulting from defective car brakes while
a freight car was in the possession of the shipper.7 0 But the
liability of a landlord for personal injuries caused by a failure
to maintain a common entrance free of snow has been held to
be governed by the state rule.7 1
VI. Real Property
In announcing the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, Mr. Justice
Story said that in cases involving rights and titles to real estate
the federal courts were bound by Section 725 to follow local
usages.7 2 It is difficult to see how a local usage of a state in
regard to realty is a "law" within the meaning of this section,
when a similar local usage in regard to a chose in action is not so
considered. The courts have, however, always shown a con-
servative tendency in dealing with real property. The applica-
tion of the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson must have been recognized
by Mr. Justice Story as involving the possibility of a different
rule in the federal courts from that prevailing in the state
66 See N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Fruchter, supra, at 421.
67 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Marone, 246 Fed. 916 (C. C. A. 8th, 1917).
So also the liability of a principal for the torts of his agent's servant, Texas
Co. v. Brice, 26 F. (2d) 164 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928).
68 Elliott v. Felton, 119 Fed. 270 (C. C. A. 6th, 1902); Jones v. So. Pac.
Co., 144 Fed. 973 (C. C. A. 5th, 1906); Kinnear Mfg. Co. v. Carlisle, 152
Fed. 933 (C. C. A. 6th, 1907); Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Hart, 176 Fed. 245 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1910) ; Beutler v. Grand Trunk Junction Ry., 224 U. S. 85 (1912).
69 Curtis v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 140 Fed. 777 (E. D. Ill.
1905).
70 Waldron v. Director General, 266 Fed. 197 (C. C. A. 4th, 1920).
71 United Shoe Machinery Corp. -v. Paine, 26 F. (2d) 594 (C. C. A. 1st,
1928).
7-2 16 Pet. (U. S.) at 18.
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courts. Such a conflict would be especially undesirable in the
field of real property, where predictability has always been the
desideratum. Moreover, matters in regard to real property
have been considered as of primarily local concern. The federal
courts have, therefore, generally followed state decisions on the
ground that they established rules of property. But it has
been said that a single state decision does not establish such a
rule of property and may, consequently, be disregarded by the
federal courts. 73  Another reason given by the federal courts
for their refusal to follow state decisions on questions of real
property is that the decisions were rendered after rights had
accrued, and hence were not rules of property when the trans-
action occurred. 74
The determination of the legal effect of a will or deed may
involve the question whether a remainder sought to be created
is vested or contingent, or whether a charitable trust was validly
established. 5uch questions will be controlled when they arise
in the federal courts by state decisions construing similar pro-
visions in wills or deeds. 75 So also will a federal court follow
state decisions construing a clause in a mortgage assigning rents
and profits to the mortgagee as operating only after the mort-
gagee has taken possession on default.76 Indeed, all questions
of construction of deeds or wills, in so far as they affect interests
in land, are to be determined in accordance with the state rule.77
Although a contract of insurance does not affect interests in
land, it may be necessary in construing the contract to deter-
73 See Pineland Club -v. Robert, 213 Fed. 545, 556 (C. C. A. 4th, 1914);
Helm v. Zarecor, 213 Fed. 648, 655 (M. D. Tenn. 1913); Knox & Lewis v.
Alwood, 228 Fed. 753, 756 (S. D. Ga. 1915). Contra., Sutherland v. Sell-
ing, 16 F. (2d) 865 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926).
74 See Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349, 360 (1910); Helm v.
Zarecor, supra. Cf. p. 368, n. 6, supra. Cf. also In re Ames, 289 Fed. 208
(C. C. A. 6th, 1923).
75 Lucas v. M'Neill, 231 Fed. 672 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916); Sutherland v.
Selling, supra; Smith v. Sweetser, 19 F. (2d) 974 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927).
76 In re Israelson, 230 Fed. 1000 (S. D. N. Y. 1916).
77 Dickson #. Wildman, 183 Fed. 398 (C. C. A. 5th, 1910); Thompson,
et al. v. Sloss-Sheffleld Steel & Iron Co., 209 Fed. 840 (C. C. A. 5th, 1914);
Thurlow v. Waite Phillips Co., 22 F. (2d) 781 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); Mathias
v. Hemingway, 24 F. (2d) 951 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928). But see Midland Val-
ley R. Co. v. Jarvis, 29 F. (2d) 539, 541 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928), Contra. But
in determining whether rent under a ninety-nine year coal lease is income
under a federal statute, the federal courts would not be bound by the state
rule which would require a holding that there had been a sale of coal in
place. Rosenberger v. McCaughn, 25 F. (2d) 699 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928).
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mine what are the incidents and nature of the assured's interest
in the land. Thus, where a policy of insurance is conditioned
upon the assured's sole and unconditional ownership, state deci-
sions will be referred to in order to discover whether a husband
holding as tenant by the entirety has such incidents of owner-
ship as comply with the fair meaning of the clause as found by
the federal court.78
Whether an oil and gas lease of riparian land carries the right
to drill in land formed by accretion is a question on which the
federal courts will be bound by state decisions.79 And a rule
of property established by state decisions that a riparian owner
on a non-navigable lake owns to the center is controlling in the
federal courts.80 Likewise, they will follow state decisions defin-
ing the right to purchase tide land granted by the state to
upland owners as real, rather than personal, property.81
Other matters in regard to which local decisions are rules of
property include the character of fixtures as real or personal
property,S2 the nature of adverse possession necessary for the
acquisition of title,83 and whether a grantor's lien is to be recog-
nized.84 So also whether a conveyance of land is fraudulent
will be determined in accordance with state decisions.85 And a
federal court will follow a state rule recognizing legal title to
a corporation's real property as vesting in the stockholders after
the expiration of the corporation's charter.8 6
VII. Personal Property
The rule of conformity to state decisions concerning real
property which was laid down for the federal courts by Mr.
Justice Story in Swift v. Tyson has been extended to state deci-
7s McNeil v. Conn. Fire Ins. Co., 24 F. (2d) 221 (W. D. Tenn. 1928).
70 Thurlow v. Waite Phillips, Co., supra.
so United States v. Lee Wilson & Co., 214 Fed. 630 (E. D. Ark. 1914).
81 Schofield v. Baker, 212 Fed. 504 (W. D. Wash. 1914).
82 N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Allison, 107 Fed. 179 (C. C. A. 2d, 1901).
83 United States v. One Lot of Land, 178 Fed. 334 (S. D. Ga. 1910);
Bellamy v. Pitts, 4 F. (2d) 523 (C. C. A. 5th, 1925).
84 Consol. Ariz. Smelt. Co. v. Hinchman, 212 Fed. 813 (C. C. A. 1st,
1914); Farrell v. Wysong, 246 Fed. 281 (C. C. A. 8th, 1917).
8r Williams v. Adler-Goldman Con. Co., 227 Fed. 374 (C. C. A. 8th,
1915).
8r Stearns Coal & Lbr. Co. v. Van Winkle, 221 Fed. 590 (C. C. A. 6th,
1915).
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sions establishing rules of property for interests in chattels.
Federal courts will follow a rule of property established by,
state decisions holding that retention of possession by the vendor
renders the sale of goods void as against his creditors.8 7 The
validity and effect of chattel mortgages, 8 8 conditional sales,8 9
and trust receipts 9o will also be governed by state decisions.
The question as to whether the federal courts will depart
from state decisions interpreting that part of the Uniform Sales
Act which is a codification of the common law, is not so likely
to be raised as in the case of state decisions interpreting the
Negotiable Instruments Law. Most of the provisions in the
Uniform Sales Act concern interests in chattels, and on these
matters state decisions would be controlling, even in the absence
of a statute.
VIII. Measure of Damages
In an action by a lessee for breach of a covenant of quiet
enjoyment, it has been held that the state rule in regard to dam-
ages should be followed.931 But it has been held that in an action
for breach of contract to sell land the federal court will not be
bound by the state rule giving as damages the price paid, plus
interest. 92 The difference in result in the two cases may be
explained by the fact that the former dealt with the law of real
property, and the latter with the law of contracts. As might
be expected, the neasure of damages when no rule of property
87 Dooley v. Pease, 180 U. S. 126 (1901) ; In re Ricketts, 234 Fed. 285
(C. C. A. 7th, 1916).
88 In Re Antigo Screen Door Co., 123 Fed. 249 (C. C. A. 7th, 1903);
Dodge v. Norlin, 133 Fed. 363 (C. C. A. 8th, 1904); In re First National
Bank, 135 Fed. 62 (C. C. A. 6th, 1905); Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U. S.
516 (1905); In re East End Mantel & Tile Co., 202 Fed. 275 (W. D. Pa.
1913); Scandinavian-American Bank v. Sabin, 227 Fed. 579 (C. C. A. 9th,
1915) ; In re Packard Press, 5 F. (2d) 633 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
89 Bryant v. Swofford Bro. Dry Goods Co., 214 U. S. 279 (1909); Tri-
umph Electric Co. v. Patterson, 211 Fed. 244 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914); Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Richardson, 233 Fed. 84 (C. C. A. 3d, 1916).
90 Wood Co. v. Eubanks, 169 Fed. 929 (C. C. A. 4th, 1909); Swager V.
Smith, 194 Fed. 762 (C. C. A. 4th, 1912); In re Richheimer, 221 Fed. 16
(C. C. A. 7th, 1915).
91 Am. Ice Co. v. Pocono Spring Water Ice Co., 179 Fed. 868 (E. D. Pa.
1910) ; Thorley v. Pabst Brewing Co., 179 Fed. 338 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910).
92 Clark v. Belt, 223 Fed. 573 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915).
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is involved is treated as a matter of general jurisprudence.93
But the federal courts are not in agreement as to whether the
allowance of interest on a cause of action is a question of gen-
eral jurisprudence.9 4 They have held that they were bound by
state decisions establishing the rate of interest.9 5
IX. Conflict of Laws
The rule seems well established that in questions of the con-
flict of laws, the federal courts are not bound by state decisions.
The right of access to the federal courts is a matter which goes
to their jurisdiction and which, therefore, cannot be controlled
even by state statutes. Thus, an Ohio statute denying the right
to sue in Ohio under a wrongful death act of another state under
certain circumstances, was held ineffective to prevent a suit in
the federal court in Ohio.) 6 And the federal court in Wisconsin
has enforced the liability of stockholders in a Minnesota cor-
poration, although no such suit could be brought in the Wis-
consin state courts. 97 It has likewise been held that the federal
courts will determine for themselves whether the essential
validity of a contract is governed by the law of the place of
making or the law of the place of performance.98
X. Evidence
It has been pointed out above9 9 that there is an uncertainty
in the modern federal cases as to whether matters of evidence
fall within the Conformity Act or Section 725 of Title 28 of the
United States Code. The purpose of this paper is to consider
93 Woldson, v. Larson, 164 Fed. 548 (C. C. A. 9th, 1908); Norfolk & P.
Traction Co. v. Miller, 174 Fed. 607 (C. C. A. 4th, 1909) ; Power v. City of
Augusta, 191 Fed. 647 (E. D. Ky. 1911); Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha, Ltd. v.
Davis, 291 Fed. 882 (S. D. N. Y. 1922). But see Gilman v. Lamson Co.,
234 Fed. 507, 518 (C. C. A. 1st, 1916).
94 Compare Cahan v. Empire Trust Co., 9 F. (2d) 713 (C. C. A. 2d,
1926) with Sears v. Greater N. Y. Development Co., 19 F. (2d) 654 (D.
Mass. 1927).
95 Western Transit Co. v. Davidson S. S. Co., 212 Fed. 696 (C. C. A. 6th,
1914); Sears v. Greater N. Y. Development Co., supra.
96 St. Bernard v. Shane, 220 Fed. 852 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915).
97 Convcrse v. Mears, 162 Fed. 767 (W. D. Wis. 1908).
98 Manship v. New So. Building & Loan Ass'n., 110 Fed. 845 (S. D.
Miss. 1901); U. S. Savings & Loan Co. v. Harris, 113 Fed. 27 (E. D. Ky.
1902).
99 See p. 367, n. 2, supra.
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the cases only in so far as they treat points of evidence as com-
ing under Section 725.
There is a conflict as to whether federal courts will follow
state rules as to the burden of proof.10 0 It has been held that
the federal courts will form their own opinion concerning the
extent and application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.10 1
There is also a conflict as to whether federal courts will follow
state decisions allowing truth and veracity evidence to be used
to rehabilitate the testimony of a witness whose character has
not been attacked. 0 2 The application of the parol evidence rule
is a matter of general commercial law on which decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States will control in the fed-
eral courts.'0 3
XI. Miscellaneous
The liability of a principal for the deceit of his agent has
been held a question of general jurisprudence. 10 4 So also the
question whether a charitable institution will be liable under
the doctrine of respondeat superior is one on which the state
decisions will not control in the federal courts. 0 5
Whether priority of a state's claim is a prerogative right or
a rule of administration is a matter of local law. Consequently,
when state decisions hold it to be the former, the state's priority
will be recognized in the federal courts.'0 6
100 Compare First National Bank v. Liewer, 187 Fed. 16 (C. C. A. 8th,
1911), and Conrad v. Wheelock, 24 F. (2d) 996 (S. D. Ill. 1928), with
Islesworth Hotel Co. v. Ward, 270 Fed. 86 (C. C. A. 3d, 1921). And Cf.
Crittenden v. Widrevitz, 272 Fed. 871 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921).
lOlPatton v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 179 Fed. 530 (W. D. Ky 1910). Cf.
Toby v. Scranton Ry. Co., 245 Fed. 365 (M. D. Pa. 1917).
102 Compare Louisville & N. R. Co. v. McClish, 115 Fed. 268 (C. C. A.
6th, 1902) and West Tenn. Grain Co. v. Shaffer & Co., 299 Fed. 197 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1924) with Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. Luray Supply Co., 6 F. (2d)
218 (C. C. A. 4th, 1925).
103 Sioux Falls National Bank v. Klaveness, 264 Fed. 40 (C. C. A. 8th,
1920).
104 Harris, Irby & Vose v. Allied Compress Co., 6 F. (2d) 7 (C. C. A.
5th, 1925); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Gleason, 21 F. (2d) 883 (C. C. A. 5th,
1927), certiorari granted 48 Sup. Ct. 321 (1928).
1065 Paterlini v. Memorial Hospital, 229 Fed. 838 (W. D. Pa. 1915).
106 Marshall v. New York, 254 U. S. 380 (1920). Cf. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co. v. Bramwell, 12 F. (2d) 307 (D. Ore. 1926).
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United States courts will not be controlled by state decisions
in determining who are bound by judgments. 10 7
The federal courts do not recognize an attorney as having a
lien on funds recovered as a result of his efforts when no such
lien is recognized by the state courts. 08 Perhaps the courts
are influenced here by the idea that liens are matters of property
law. But it is to be noted that often no tangible property is
involved when an attorney's lien is asserted. Anfit is interest-
ing to compare the refusal of the federal courts to follow state
decisions in regard to successive assignments of choses in
action. 09
How far courts will inquire into the validity of a church union
is a matter of general jurisprudence upon which the federal
courts will not follow state decisions." 0 This is so even when
the question of union is raised in a suit for the possession of
real property."l0
What will excuse a plaintiff in a replevin action for the non-
return of property when he fails to establish his title, is held a
matter of general law, although personal property is involved.",
Whether an obligation ex contractu arises upon the conver-
sion of goods and is available in bankruptcy as an unliquidated
claim, is determined by the federal courts according to their
own view of the common law."12
CONCLUSION
A technical reason for the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson is that
federal courts are of co-ordinate jurisdiction with the courts of
the state in which they sit." 3 Consequently, the federal courts
are entitled to form their own opinion as to what the law of
107 Columbia Ins. Co. v. Waterman Co, 11 F. (2d) 216 (C. C. A. 2d,
1926).
108 Cain v. Hockensmith Wheel & Car Co., 157 Fed. 992 (W. D. Pa.
1907). See Sun Life Assur. Co. v. Casanova, 260 Fed. 449, 452 (C. C. A.
1st, 1919).
1 09 Supra, p. 367, n. 3.
110 Sherard v. Walton, 206 Fed. 562 (W. D. Tenn. 1913). Cf. Helm V.
Zarecor, 213 Fed. 648 (M. D. Tenn. 1913).
111 Threo States Lumber Co. v. Blanks, 133 Fed. 479, 482 (C. C. A. 6th,
1904).
1 2 See Reynolds v. N. Y. Trust Co., 188 Fed. 611, 615 (C. C. A. 1st,
1911).
"3 Beale, "Treatise on the Conflict of Laws" (1916) Sec. 112a.
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the state is.114 But some cases have gone further. Where a
cause of action has accrued in one state and suit has been
brought in a federal court sitting in another, the federal court
has decided the case upon principles of general jurisprudence,
contrary to the decisions of the state where the cause of action
arose.115
This disregard of state decisions by a federal court in another
state could be justified if the court adopted the law which is
applied by the federal court sitting in the state where the
alleged wrong occurred. But where there are no federal deci-
sions in that state and there are no decisions on the point by
the Supreme Court of the United States, 116 it is hardly right
for a federal court in another state to disregard decisions of
the state courts in the state where the cause of action accrued.
For these decisions are the only authoritative evidence of the
law of that state. The federal courts which form their own
opinion as to the law of a state in which they do not sit by
calling the matter one of general jurisprudence, cannot, there-
fore, be defended under the technical reason suggested above.
The position of these courts may possibly be explained by the
theory that there is one system of general law existing in the
states which have inherited the common law of England which
the courts in any state are competent to expound. This theory,
however, is based on the failure of the courts to perceive the
double meaning of the word "law".117 And it is inconsistent
114 It is uncertain whether under the prevailing doctrine the federal
courts would regard themselves as authorities upon the general law of
Louisiana superior to those trained in the civil law system. See Holmes, J.,
dissenting in Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co.,
U. S. Sup. Ct., decided April 9, 1928. And cf. Jones v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 18 F. (2d) 650 (W. D. La. 1926).
115 The Avalon, 169 Fed. 696 (N. D. W. Va. 1909); Clark v. Belt, 223
Fed. 573 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915). Contra, Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Naha-s,
14 F. (2d) 56 (C. C. A. 3d, 1926). And see Am. Trading Co. v. Steele,
274 Fed. 774, 778 (C. C. A. 9th, 1921).
116 Cf. Johnson v. Norton Co., 159 Fed. 361 (C. C. A. 6th, 1908).
117 "Law is a word used with different meanings, but law in the sense in
which courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority
behind it. The common law so far as it is enforced in a state, whether
called common law or not, is not the common law generally, but the law of
that state, existing by the authority of that state without regard to what
it may have been in England or anywhere else." See Holmes, J., dissenting
in Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., U. S. Sup.
Ct., decided April 9, 1928.
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with the idea that the courts of each state are the final arbiters
of its law. It may be wondered if any federal court would ever
apply this theory to a cause of action arising in England or any
other common law country.
However difficult it may be to find a technical justification
for the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, and in spite of all the criti-
cism which has been directed against it, the doctrine is firmly
imbedded in our federal jurisprudence.1 1 The most that can
be hoped for is that there will be greater unanimity among the
federal courts in classifying the questions upon which they will
exercise an independent judgment.
118 There seems to be no likelihood that Section 725 will be amended so
as expressly to require the federal courts to follow state decisions as well as
state statutes. But see Senate Resolution 4333, 69th Congress, 1st Session;
U. S. Daily May 4, 1928, page 585, column 4. (Bill introduced by Senator
Walsh, Montana, providing that state decisions should govern federal courts
in the ascertainment of the common law or general jurisprudence.)
